Tuesday, November 18, 2008
A Quick, Cheap Housing and Economy Fix
Sell the glut of houses to immigrants. It will cost taxpayers nothing. All that Congress & the President would have to do is to authorize those who are already on the waiting list, and have the money to buy a house, to come on in.
Even administrative costs would be minimal. Those who can show the financial ability to buy a house could get temporary visas to come in (I would not want them to buy a house unseen), pick a house, and make the arrangements. When the money is transferred and the new title recorded, they get their green card and can occupy the house.
The entire surplus of American houses could be disposed of in six months to a year. Housing prices would stop falling, so people would (mostly) stop defaulting on their mortgages. Banks would be saved.
Cost to tax payers: zero.
The anti-immigrant types might scream, but we would not be letting in more immigrants in the long run. Just speeding up the current program. Quotas would remain the same, so legal immigration would slow for a while once the program was completed.
I just can't think of anything wrong with this idea, except that it does not involve giving away taxpayer dollars, and most politicians are too spineless to tack into the the anti-immigration headwinds even when the benefits to the United States of America are so obvious.
Pass the idea along.
Monday, October 13, 2008
Strange Securities Auctions
You hear about an auction and it sounds like you might want some of items in it, if the prices are right. The auctioneers will take only cash, so you put together what you have, say $55. You get stuck in traffic, so you arrive late. Outside people are already boasting of what great bargains they won. You hurry in.
The auctioneer, "the next item is a bundle of $1 bills, 100 of them." You think it is a strange item to auction: it is clearly worth $100 [assume these are not bills of value to collectors, or counterfeits, just ordinary $1 bills]. No one makes an offer at first, because everyone says assumes that it will be bid up to just short of $100, so bidding is a waste of time. But the tension builds and you decide why not, and open at $10. At that point the bidding goes quickly up to $29, then stalls. You offer $30. No one else bids against you. You win the $100. You pay $30 for the $100 and have $70 at the end. Meanwhile the auction has ended.
How could that happen (aside from the fact no one would auction off actual money like that)? Everyone else had run out of money. The next richest bidder in the room only had $29. It is your lucky day.
Translating this imaginary excursion closer to reality, now suppose that the item you bid $30 on and won was a mortgage bond worth $100. It really is worth $100, because the mortgage backing the bond is sound and will pay $100 over time. You win the auction not because the bond is worth $30, but because there is not enough cash to efficiently price the auction. Free market ideals have broken down.
Lately, almost no one has wanted to participate in auctions of at least two types of securities, mortgage-related bonds derivative securities and auction-rate securities.
There are two basic reasons there has been little bidding for weeks now: fear and lack of cash to bid with. The kind of institutions that can play this sort of game were all suddenly short of cash, and wanting to auction off what they could for cash, rather than using their precious cash to buy more securities. But no one else knows how to price the securities. For instance, it is difficult to find out which particular houses correspond to which particular mortgage bonds; linking the houses to derivatives is even more complex. So it is not exactly like buying a bag of $1 bills, if you just start buying a bunch of bags without looking in them. It is like buying an unopened bag of $1 bills and moths. It might have $100 of usable bills in it, or it might be all moths, or anywhere in between.
This is a problem for the government bail-out program; is the government going to look in each bag before it uses taxpayer money to buy it, or is it going to guess about the value of huge groups of bags using sampling techniques.
In free market theory prices are supposed to emerge in an efficient manner and result in efficient allocations of resources. Putting aside that there may be (in fact, are) problems with free market economics even when pricing of commodities is efficient, in the real world the conditions necessary for efficient pricing often don't exist.
For an auction to price items efficiently, there need to be a reasonable number of bidders and a reasonable number of items to bid on. If anyone has the power to set prices, prices will be set by that person, not by the market.
Even when there are reasonable numbers of buyers and sellers, because of human nature, prices can get out of whack, as in both bubbles and Depressions. The housing market is an auction market. Two years ago there were relatively few houses compared to bidders, resulting in unrealistic, high pricing. Now the same houses are in abundance compared to bidders, so in many cases sales are either not made (because in effect the people auctioning off their houses have set a minimum bid that no one will meet) or made at well below the real value of the house. The actual cost of construction being a good surrogate for real value for new homes, and that cost adjusted for inflation and physical deterioration being a good surrogate for used homes.
The Federal Reserve has been tasked with making sure their are neither too many nor too few dollars in circulation. When there are too many dollars, they are used freely to create inflation and asset bubbles. When there are too few dollars, people are forced to sell assets at less than their real values. Free market theories pretend that the only real value is the selling price, and it a very real sense that is true. But when selling prices depend on the whim of the Federal Reserve, you might want to ask yourself: what really is true, and what is bull?
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Saving Wall Street, Pros and Cons
Yet joining the criticism of the strange coalition of left-of-center Democrats and right-wind House Republicans who "opposed" the Treasury plan mainly to make political hay just seems like jumping on a pile of big guys who have already caused permanent injury to a quarterback who had a million dollar arm just a few moments earlier. The House Republicans say they don't want ordinary taxpayers to bail out Wall Street. That is a laugh, except that some of their constituents are so brain dead they probably swallowed that poll-driven excrement without a thought.
,
I agree with progressives that a bottom-up rescue plan would be better. But we are stuck with the decision makers that the American voters chose, and the way things work is most incumbents will be re-elected to Congress in November. I have never drunk the free-markets always work kool-aid, but I also know that a credit freeze will almost certainly throw this country into an economic depression, and quickly. It would be very hard to dig our way out of such a Depression. In 1929 when the last Depression began the national treasury was almost debt-free. That is not the case today. The government won't be able to spend its way out of a Depression because no one will be willing to finance that level of spending. The only alternative is the kind of inflation that destroyed Germany in the 1920's, or enduring the pain until the business cycle eventually gets back on track by itself. The possibility of the complete collapse of civilization as we know it is no longer totally improbable in the short run.
So I am for the $700 billion (probably more like $1 trillion, by the time it is over) bail out of Wall Street. In effect taxpayers are buying assets that may increase or decrease in value. Congress did insist on some good changes to the original plan. It could be much worse.
It is not the first bailout in American history, and it is not always Wall Street that gets bailed out. Remember that IRS "refund" check you got a few months ago? That, aside from being a shameless election year ploy, was a bailout for us all. And some bailouts are so institutionalized we don't think twice about them, like receiving unemployment insurance or Social Security disability payments, or food stamps.
The problem with bailouts evenly distributed among the citizens or taxpayers is that they just don't work in the kind of situation we have right now. Quite a few people may have caught up on a single mortgage payment with the tax refund, but they are in trouble precisely because they habitually spend more than they make, so most of them were probably in trouble again the next month. They need their life styles to be cut back. If they did that it might be worth the government doing something about refinancing their mortgage payments.
When Wall Street was raking in profits 3 years ago, it was because they concentrated the profits from millions of relatively small transactions. In this crisis we see the concentration of millions of small losses (small here might mean up to $1 million dollars per mortgage). To deal with the crisis quickly, the fire must be put out where it is burning, not where we would like to fight fires in the future.
What is sad is that once the crisis goes away, no fundamental reform is likely. There were a few fundamental reforms in the Great Depression partly because the crisis was not averted early on, in 1930. Some radicals might argue, (and I'm tempted) that therefore it would be best to let Wall Street and the entire free-market Capitalist religion fall. The problem is that good cultural, political and economic systems don't automatically spring up after bad systems have crashed. In the last Great Depression many nations ended up with Fascist governments (See my fascism pages): Italy, Germany, and Spain of course, but also France, Austria, Slovakia, Poland and others. Even the New Deal had many fascist-type elements, most notably the death-grip on power held by President-for-life Roosevelt.
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Glass-Steagall, and Bill Clinton
During an election, if the economy is bad, there is a tendency to blame everything on the party in power. Senator Obama's attacks on Senator McCain about Gramm-Leach-Bliley are not unjustified. However, Obama's party, the Democratic Party, was just as responsible for repealing Glass-Steagall as the Republican Party. Given Barack's spineless political career we can surmise that he would have voted for Gramm-Leach like everyone else, had he been in the Senate or House of Representatives at that time.
At the shallowest level, we are simply seeing the usual political-economic cycles that have been taking place since the first flint ax was traded for the first sea shell. Mixing ordinary banking (taking deposits, making loans) with Wall Street style banking (creating and trading stocks, bonds, and more complex financial instruments) was clearly a cause of the Great Depression. So Congress built a firewall with Glass-Steagall. At the time the bankers were bankrupt and unable to bribe their way out of the situation.
But when no fire transited from banking to brokerage houses, or vice-versa, for a number of decades, pressures began to build. That firewall did not just prevent fires, it prevent people from making quick bucks. Flexible politicians were found, particularly new ones who did not remember the Great Depression. One of the most flexible modern politicians was Bill Clinton, a Democrat. He named Robert Rubin to be his Secretary of the Treasury, and he kept Alan Greenspan as Federal Reserve Chairman. Think of these men as voracious predators with no respect for anything put power and money. Together they put in place the key "reform" that allowed the rapacious mortgage and derivatives frenzy of 2004-2006. Now taxpayers will be further burdened to clean up the mess.
So what is Senator Barack Obama going to do about it if he becomes President? What will Senator McCain do about it if he becomes President? The standard answer seems to be: make the Federal Reserve more powerful. None of the old "power to the people" solutions are even conceived of, except perhaps by Green Party candidate Cynthia McKinney. But it was the Federal Reserve that helped pressure Congress into repealing Glass-Steagall.
Politicians will say anything to get elected. Congress, not the President, is supposed to write the laws. Most American citizens vote without knowing anything about their representatives in Congress. Until people are better informed and more able to exercise power directly, don't expect any major changes in our system.
Sunday, September 14, 2008
Double Bubble, Toil and Trouble
Consider that the Internet stock bubble that peaked in 2000 cannot be directly blamed on the Republican Party, since Democrat Bill Clinton was President and his Vice President Al Gore was a early proponent of the Internet. Congress, however, was controlled by the Republicans. The Federal Reserve probably deserves most of the blame for that bubble.
The Housing mortgage bubble that burst in 2007, with aftershocks still shaking up 2008, cannot be blamed on the Democrats. Even though Democrats controlled Congress by the time the bubble burst, we had a Republican President, George W. Bush, during the build-up to the bubble. Again, the Federal Reserve deserves most of the blame for the bubble (if you don't count the banks, the mortgage brokers, and the fools who bought at the top of the housing market).
So should we blame the Federal Reserve? Is the two-party system just a circus to keep most citizens distracted while we are really governed by an all-powerful, appointed, cabal of the highest reaches of banking and government? The two-party system is a circus, but it is not just a circus. The Federal Reserve is powerful, but today the corporate new media is saying the bubbles were because the Federal Reserve had too little power, not too much. There is a bit of truth in that, but they did have the power to raise interest rates. Raising interest rates earlier during each of the bubbles would probably would have prevented many of the excesses that damaged the entire economy when the bubbles popped. Yet those who hate the Federal Reserve would have hated that even more. In the housing bubble, the left would have pointed to the injustice of raising interest rates to the point where ordinary people were unable to buy homes, and the right would have screamed because it would have slowed down a none-too robust economy.
Noam Chomsky has talked about the way our "free market" economy tends to privatize profits and socialize losses. That is, the workers have to clean up after the rich. We are seeing that now with the banking bailouts. Executives walk away with their winnings, they don't have to give anything back to the stockholders or customers or employees or other losers. No one is paying back the fees generated by mortgages that should never have been made. The financial press, at least that part aimed (propaganda should always be carefully aimed, otherwise there might be casualties from friendly fire) at the unsophisticated, have failed to talk about bondholders at Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. When the U.S. Government backs these institutions, it is saving the bondholders' investments. The bondholders took a risk in lending money to Fannie Mae to lend (through middlemen) to home buyers, but instead of being forced to take their losses, they will get paid all the interest and principle promised. Stockholders are losing almost everything; bondholders are fully protected. Old money tends to be in bonds; new money tends to be in stocks. Even among the very wealthy there is a system of caste and privilege.
Most Americans are just going to have to work harder and make do with less. Of course finding a job if you are an unemployed carpenter or real estate broker is not easy to do right now: you can't work harder when you are not working at all. American workers find themselves in the modern equivalent of lying prostate in the cotton field, genuinely unable to move a muscle because of poor food, heat, and exhaustion, while the overseer (never the master, who is drinking fine whiskey while trying to guess what price cotton will fetch in New Orleans this year) lays on the whip, demanding that they get up and produce more, more, more. You can't work harder or smarter if no work is to be found because the nation's capital was allocated to financial speculation.
The federal government is going to have to raise taxes or spend a lot less money on services, or it will bankrupt the entire nation without having to wait for the long term. Fortunately the Bush Tax Cuts for the Rich (which many Democrats in Congress originally voted for) are apt to expire in 2010, regardless of who is elected President, as long as the Democrats control Congress.
Financial bubbles have many components, but the ones that are large enough to matter are always based on credit bubbles. Credit is needed to provide the money used to bid up the price of whatever assets are in the bubble. The Internet Bubble was a typical bubble; many people called it a bubble long before it burst. Only idiots owned the stocks when they started to crash. Every Internet stock was hyped as the next Microsoft, while stocks of companies that were making real goods and profits were neglected. The credit involved was the ordinary kind, made possible by the Fed keeping interest rates too low.
The Housing bubble was weirder. With an Internet company at least the fiction was there that it might become more valuable over time, when it learned to convert page views to real money. But a house is a house. A neighborhood might become more popular, driving up prices locally, but the whole nation is not a neighborhood. House prices rise gradually over time mostly because of inflation. The bubble got its start because housing was not a popular investment during the 1990's stock market boom. When the Internet bubble broke, housing was relatively cheap and interest rates on mortgages were exceptionally low. Buyers moved in, sending up prices and getting the ball rolling. Then the bubble was driven by short-sighted banks and mortgage companies that were able to give credit at no risk because it was other people's money, and collect big fees for that service. As soon as the Federal Reserve raised interest rates towards normal levels, the bubble started to fall apart.
I think a lot of people saw it coming and decided to grab while the grabbing was good.
The real estate industry has always been a major financial backer of both Democratic Party and Republican Party politicians, from local city councils up through Congress and the Presidency. Don't expect anyone to give the real estate speculators a spanking.
As always, the American worker and small businesses, and a few well-run, non-glamorous, large businesses, will pull everyone's ass out of this mess and get no credit for it. But until ordinary Americans wake up and think things through, organize and act on a sound analysis, they are going to keep getting lashed by the wise guys on Wall Street. Neither the Democratic Party, nor the Republican Party, as currently configured, are capable of taking on Wall Street or the real estate speculation lobby.
With interest rates nice and low now, and no shortage of stupid people in the world, the next bubble is brewing somewhere. Only time will show where.
Tuesday, February 5, 2008
Housing, the Credit Squeeze, and Glass-Steagall Act
The current United States economic crisis is a direct consequence of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act [passed as the Banking Act of 1933]. While restoring the act's provisions will not end the crisis, it would go a long way to preventing future economic near-meltdowns.
The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in 1933 after Congress had looked into the causes of the Great Depression. It was a wise law and did much to protect the American economy until it was effectively repealed by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.
Before Glass-Steagall a bank was a bank and could even be a stock brokerage house. We can categorize banks into three varieties. Retail banks mainly take deposits for checking and savings and make loans for housing, consumer items, and business needs. You can include Savings & Loans and Credit Unions in this broad category.
The second type is an investment or merchant bank. A merchant bank deals mostly with businesses and mostly lends out its own capital. It may take ownership stakes in businesses, or speculate in stocks. It may arrange for corporations to raise money by selling bonds. It do other services for fees, like arranging mergers and acquisitions.
The third type of bank is usually called a brokerage house. It might do some things a merchant bank does, but its principle business is buying and selling securities for clients for a fee. If it helps launch new stocks or bonds for companies, or speculates with its own money, it may become more of a merchant bank.
In many cases as a brokerage house or merchant bank grows it adds functions and the two categories start resembling each other. Before Glass-Steagall a banking corporation could legally function as all three types of banks, though many banks, especially smaller ones, kept to their specialties. So, for instance, a bank could take retail deposits from customers, lend money out for residential house mortgages, run an internal brokerage operation, and even originate stock and bond offerings.
There were many reasons for bank failures during the depression, and economists still argue about what made the stock market and economy collapse. The congressional committee that wrote the Banking Act of 1933 concluded that a major cause of the economic collapse that followed the stock market collapse was the blending of functions in banks. Basically, instead of taking non-business deposits and lending them out as mortgages, some banks had used those funds to speculate in the stock market in the late 1920's, or had loaned them to investors (margin loans) who speculated in stocks. When the market crashed these banks then were unable to repay their ordinary depositors. In addition Citibank's brokerage arm had advised clients to buy stocks that it knew were overpriced and at the same time shorted those stocks so as to profit from the downswing.
Glass-Steagall forced banks to chose between being what we now call a bank, an institution that takes retail deposits, and a brokerage house or merchant bank that specialized in stocks, bonds, and related activities.
In the 1990's a concerted effort was made to overturn Glass-Steagall. While the banks and brokerages pushed at Congress and the Clinton Administration, the Federal Reserve led by Alan Greenspan and other regulators looked the other way while retail banks started merchant bank activities and vice-versa. Leading the charge was Robert Rubin, U.S. Treasury Secretary from 1995 until 1999 (he was a former Goldman Sachs partner). Having done the dirty deed, he joined Citigroup and still serves as its chairman.
Citigroup has been highly involved in the mortgage-based economic meltdown of 2007. Citigroup now consists of a retail banking arm, a merchant banking arm, and a stock-brokerage arm, an insurance arm, etc. Other large banks such as Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase, all engage in multiple activities that would be prohibited by Glass-Steagall if it were still a law.
So has does that figure into the current credit and liquidity shortage resulting from the deflating of the housing bubble?
Banks, that is retail or consumer banks, used to hold mortgages. They took in deposits and made loans including mortgages. However, back in the 20th century mortgages started to be resold. After a bank lent money to buy a house, it had less money to lend. By selling the mortgage the bank received its money back and could make another loan. When this happened a bank was acting more as a mortgage broker than in its old capacity of lending out its deposits and making a profit from the difference in interest rates.
Next came repackaging. The idea was to spread risk and allow the lenders to select a level of risk, and of return on investment, that they liked. This is also called the securitization of mortgages. Mortgage origination companies suddenly had a new economic role. They originated mortgages and made their money on the transaction fees. The mortgages were repackaged by banks, which also repackaged their own mortgages. The mortgages were blended and sliced and diced to be sold as securities. Often the end holder of the mortgage-backed security was a pension fund, a financial institution, or a wealthy individual or family trust looking for higher returns (interest) than could be gotten by buying U.S. treasuries or corporate bonds.
It all smelled so sweet while the bubble was inflating. People got houses. Rich people got high-dividend securities that were AAA rated because, after all, housing prices always go up so all that risk was more theoretical than real.
Or you could look at it this way: what appeared to be a security was actually a loan. They people who borrowed the money don't know who the lenders are and would not care about them anyway. And loans don't always get paid back.
The problem for the banking system, beyond individuals failing to make their mortgage payments, is that the very credibility of the system was endangered by combining retail and merchant banking. Many of the mortgages were made with some fraudulent misrepresentation to the buyers. At the other end banks minimized the risks involved when selling the mortgage securities to the end lenders. Citicorp and Merrill Lynch, among others, came out looking particularly stupid because they bought their own sales pitch.
Some banks lost a lot of money quickly because they had speculated in the securities they had created. They also had become dependent on the fees generated at each stage of the process.
So the banks became illiquid in 2007 and had to be bailed out by the Federal Reserve. Now we are in February 2008 and many people can't get the loans they need to buy houses, even if they have downs and good credit records. So banks that made foolish loans two years ago can't make good loans today.
Citicorp's retail operations, its banks that take in deposits, have been endangered by its merchant arm that created and held mortgage-backed securities. We are really lucky that there is federal deposit insurance to reassure depositors. If Citicorp depositors had decided to more their deposits to other banks in 2007, we might be in a Depression already today.
We need a clear firewall between retail banking and the securities market. Hopefully the current hard weather will convince people to fix this problem instead of waiting for another Great Depression.
I believe the criminal behavior that led to the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act needs to be investigated and punished. But that is a pipedream given how corrupt America's political and economic systems have become.
